Introduction
The U.S. defense industry is at a fork in the road. The prospect of substantial declines in defense spending has forced a basic rethinking of long-term prospects. Does the industry take the path that leads to conversion into civilian production -and thus obtain a civilian payoff on the massive national investment in defense technology -or does it take the toughminded business approach of cutting back and slimming down from its current peak?
The conversion approach has a great deal of appeal. It claims the benefit of keeping in place the jobs of defense workers who otherwise might face extended unemployment. The cutback alternative, in contrast, smacks of austerity . It is designed to maintain the financial health of the firms as they reduce excess capacity of labor and facilities and adjust to a diminished set of market opportunities. The purpose of this paper is to provide some guidance in the defense industry's selection between these two polar alternatives.
Variation in Conversion Experiences
Historical perspective is useful. Since the end of World War II, the major defense contractors have been trying to use their special talents in other areas of the economy. They have been extremely successful in converting-or to use the preferred business term, diversifying -into several large but closely related markets .
For example, the expansion from aircraft to missiles and space vehicles was a natural and noteworthy progression. Because it happened without much economic disruption, few appreciate the tremendous transformation of the airframe manufacturers into aerospace Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Western Economic Association in Seattle, Washington, July 1, 1991. It draws on the author's forthcoming book, Small Wars, Big Defense (Oxford University Press, Fall 1991). designers and producers. Several large aerospace companies also have developed and manufactured substantial numbers of civilian passenger aircraft but, except for Boeing, profitability has been elusive.
However, the far more numerous attempts on the part of the larger, specialized defense contractors to penetrate civilian non-aerospace markets have not met with similar success, and that is a kind understatement. The failed attempts literally range from canoes to computers to coffins. 1
Most of the diversification ventures outside of the defense and aerospace markets have been abandoned or sold off. The remainder generally operate at marginal levels. These negative experiences have been so frequent -and many of them have so drained the companiesthat they now constitute a major obstacle to further diversification efforts into commercial markets.
A recent survey of defense firms by the Center for Strategic and International Studies confirms these negative findings. A majority of the companies reported that they believe areorientation to civilian production is "neither feasible nor desirable." Most of the remainder are focusing on non-military opportunities in government. 2
Curtiss-Wright provides the most extreme example of the shortcomings of the naive diversification approach. This pioneering aviation firm -which built more aircraft during World War II than any other U.S. company-acted on the assumption that the military market would never recover from its post-World War II lows. It diversified with a vengeance into a host of miscellaneous industrial product areas. Curtiss-Wright never recovered to its previous highs. While its former competitors now enjoy annual sales of aircraft, missiles, and space vehicles in billions, the company's total revenues from its assortment of parts and components to- In the CSIS survey cited earlier, 71 percent of the defense firms stated that the Pentagon's procurement policies make it difficult for defense firms to enter or flourish in civilian markets. Bolstering their data with in-depth interviews, the researchers concluded that the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition system is a major obstacle to civilian diversification, and that military production has evolved into a business culture distinct and closed off from the normal commercial culture.
The response of one defense industry representative was typical: "With this high overhead, together with the facilities, manpower, and systems oriented toward [defense] work, it is extremely difficult to find civilian markets where we can be cost-competitive. " 5 The lack of commercial marketing experience is another familiar refrain in defense industry circles. project failed because of the lack of a distribution system. It is not hard to understand why defense company managements have become so reluctant to move from fields they have mastered into lines of business alien to them. Their lack of knowledge of nondefense industries is pervasive. It includes ignorance of products, production methods, advertising and distribution, financial arrangements, contracting forms, and the very nature of the private customer's demands.
Clearly, the type of company that can successfully design and build a new multibillion dollar ICBM network or space exploration system has a very different capability from that of the soap, steel, toy, or other typical cost-conscious but low-technology company operating in the commercial economy.
This point was underscored recently when the chief executive of Martin-Marietta, a large and relatively successful defense contractor, was asked by the Soviets how to convert a tank-producing facility into a refrigerator factory. His response was to tear down the tank plant and build a new refrigerator factory . 6 The Future of the Military Market
The bottom is not about to fall out of the military market, but a period of severe belt tightening has arrived. The most likely outcome is a substantial decline in the overall volume of defense business for the early 1990s, but with defense spending remaining high by historical standards. Such fluctuations in business opportunities are not unique to defense companies.
Other sectors of the economy regularly adjust to market shifts as part of the normal workings of a private-enterprise system. The U.S. military market, similarly, has been cyclical in nature. However, it has a very different cyclical pattern from the overall business cycle.
U.S. defense spending over the past half century has followed a stop-and-go (or rather go-andstop) cycle.
Historical Perspective
Since the beginning of World War II, the military budget has never experienced an extended period of stability. Eras of rapid growth have alternated with times of austerity.
Often the change in the size and direction of military spending has mirrored the shift in the national security environment facing the United States. This was the case after the Vietnam War when the end of hostilities permitted a substantial reduction in military spending. At other times, the shifting internal response to a relatively constant set of external factors has been more subjective. Witness the rapid buildup in the early 1980s and the abrupt decline starting in the middle of the decade. That sudden change occurred during a period when the threat to U.S. national security remained relatively constant.
The Current Outlook
What about the future? Let us examine three alternatives. An optimistic scenario of minimum change is to assume that, following the end of the Persian Gulf conflict, the modest previous downtrend in the military budget will resume. As in the late 1980s, the military budget, over the five-year period 1991-1995, will rise in nominal terms, but not rapidly enough to offset the effects of inflation. Defense spending would decline at a rate of 2 percent a year, after allowing for inflation. Over the coming five-year period, this policy would generate a reduction of approximately $80 billion compared to a stable level of defense outlays?
A second -and perhaps more realistic -scenario is to assume that Congress will refrain from voting any increase in the military budget at all , even in nominal terms. If the United States continues to experience an average inflation rate of about 4 percent a year, this would mean an annual decline at the 4 percent rate, after inflation. Over the 1991-1995 time period, this approach would generate a reduction of $158 billion in defense outlays compared to a stable level (see Table 1 ).
Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, some military experts offered a third and more pes- Under all three scenarios, a steady erosion would occur in the size of the domestic market available to U.S. defense contractors. What will be the impacts on these firms and how are they likely to respond?
The Defense Company Responses
The Major Defense Prime Contractors
There is great variety among the major defense contractors and in their dependence on the military market; consequently, they react in different ways to major changes in military spending (see Table 2 ). Let us focus initially on the large aerospace companies-such as Gen- Companies like Grumman and Northrop, which are dependent on just a few weaponsystem contracts, are likely to be in for a difficult time, depending on the future of those specific military products. They surely are more vulnerable than the more diversified defense contractors and are responding accordingly. Northrop reduced its research and development effort 46 percent in real terms between 1985 and 1989. Grumman's company-initiated R&D, after adjustment for inflation, slipped by 78 percent during that period. Servicing their high debt load limits the ability of these companies to invest in new undertakings, be they civilian diversification efforts or projects involving defense business.
Because of the military's great dependence on the major defense prime contractors for designing and building key weapon systems and subsystems, their survival as a group seems assured. Nevertheless, substantial excess capacity coupled with weak finances make for great instability in most cases. Even if these companies are all able to weather the storm, it will not be at their current volumes of sales and employment. These firms will benefit from the expansion of civilian markets, especially if macroeconomic policy succeeds in maintaining high levels of economic activity. Because their contracts with the Pentagon generally are less profitable than their commercial sales, some of these companies will respond to shrinking military markets by phasing down their defense business or trying to sell their defense segments. In one prior military cutback, AT&T's highly regarded
Bell Laboratories left this market.
Smaller Contractors and Subcontractors
Less attention is usually given to the large array of small businesses, some of whom are prime contractors, but most of whom are subcontractors and suppliers to the large firms. Some of them will be badly hurt in the defense transition, especially as prime contractors pull business back into their own factories. However, many of the smaller firms are more capable of dual military and commercial work than the larger and often more muscle-bound prime contractors. In quite a few cases, they abandoned the military market during the 1980s in favor of less regulated and more profitable commercial work.9
Facing Common Problems 
Responding to Changes in the Military Market
Over the next five years, the market for weapon systems is likely to decline by onefourth or more. 12 As a result, the major U.S. defense firms will look significantly different by the mid-1990s than they do today. They will be down substantially from the peak size they attained in the 1980s and there may be fewer of them. But to the extent that they avoid wasteful and fruitless "conversion" attempts and simply streamline their operations, they can achieve that new condition with few bankruptcies or hostile takeovers and with reasonable levels of profits and jobs.
Surely no great unmet commercial needs exist. To the extent that they do, they are being adequately met by commercial companies highly experienced in those markets. An indication of the future of the defense industry was Lockheed's painful decision in 1990 to close down all its aircraft production at Burbank, the city where it was founded. Honeywell spun off its torpedo and munitions business to its shareholders after trying unsuccessfully to sell it to other companies. Emerson Electric also spun off its defense divisions. Varian Associates dropped most of its defense operations to focus on more profitable lines of electronic equipment. Moreover, it is too soon to say whether these new diversification efforts will be any more successful financially than the poor record of the past.
Two Different Approaches
Defense companies can choose between two different models of corporate behavior in responding to large cutbacks in the military budget. To simplify, let us call these the Boeing and the Grumman approaches.
When faced with a very large decline in the orders for its basic aerospace product line back in 1971, Boeing took the painful actions required to reduce the size of the company substantially. Over one-half of the entire work force was laid off. One wag rented a billboard for a memorable message, "The last one out of Seattle, please turn off the lights."
Boeing's cutbacks were painful, extending to experienced engineers and craftsmen with considerable seniority. However, the downsizing left the company in a strong enough financial position to lead the next upturn in commercial aircraft sales and production. The result is a world-class corporation with a record backlog of orders.
Grumman, in contrast, followed the advice of those advocating "conversion" of the defense industry. It invested much of its resources in non-aerospace diversification efforts. The result has been unsuccessful, and has weakened Grumman's basic financial condition. Moreover, the job-creation objective that motivated the conversion approach was not achieved. In
June 1990, the company offered early retirement to more than one-fifth of its entire work force. to what they consider to be more efficiency-minded, civilian-oriented enterprises.
Conclusion
In any event, the Persian Gulf crisis amply demonstrated that the United States still needs a powerful military establishment and a strong base of defense contractors -just not at the present size.
Change is an essential aspect of a modern competitive economy. In the 1980s, the tremendous expansion of the aerospace and other defense companies required attracting people and capital from other parts of the economy, often to the discomfort and displeasure of those other companies. Pleasant or not, we should not expect that type of movement always to be in one direction.
Putting the issues in perspective might benefit the defense companies and their employees. They could do worse than cite the compelling words of a long-term critic of high levels of military spending:
Even if Fidel Castro shaved off his beard and became a fellow of the American Heritage FoundaiWn, we would still need the military-industrial complex for quite a while longer.
